Grenfell Tower fire

[AliG]

I found this article that goes into reasonable detail about it.

 

https://www.getwestlondon.co.uk/news/west-london-news/grenfell-tower-fire-millions-spent-14435366

 

It seems that the council have bought 307 homes but they are not all occupied yet.

 

It is not clear if they have actually bought more houses than needed and are planning to house other people.

 

It appears that they have spent around £765,000 per home. They have also spent around £25m on hotel accommodation.

 

This is not a high amount to spend in that area where house prices are extremely high. Of course this then gets you to the question of should tax payers pay to house people in areas where the average tax payer themselves could not afford to live. This isn't really relevant to Grenfell but more of a general question.

[Ferdinand]

I listened to a R4 Today Programme interview on this report with the author, before it was released, last Thursday.

 

The today interviewer spent the entire interviewer obsessed with getting an admission that “combustible” materials should be banned. Dame whatever wanted to have a serious conversation.

 

Reminds me why I now listen to R5. At least they do not pretend that they are trying to be serious.

 

You will need to press play on the link, but the start point is correct.

 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0b2gspb#playt=02h10m06s

Edited May 22, 2018 by Ferdinand

[Temp]

Someone called "lineweight" posted this detailed expert witness report on how the tower did/did not comply with the Building Regulations...

 

https://www.dropbox.com/s/9f9679e7k0yppyj/Dr Barbara Lane report_1.pdf?dl=0

 

It's full of horror stores so I just pick out.....

 

"11.18.22 I have found no evidence that proprietary cavity barriers were specified at any stage of the design or installed during construction to close the openings created in the external cavity walls by the windows."

 

snip

 

"11.18.29 I therefore conclude that every window opening in Grenfell Tower was not compliant with the provisions made in section 9.3 of ADB 2013 to provide cavity barriers to close around openings in the external wall"
 

Edited June 14, 2018 by Temp

[Jeremy Harris]

That fits with the sectional drawings that were dug out shortly after the fire, before the companies involved started trying to cleanse the internet of any of them.  There were clear gaps shown where fire escaping from a window opening could directly access the void between the rainscreen cladding and the insulation in this drawing you posted back then, @Temp:

 

[Temp]

Not sure if that link works but the original can be found here..

http://www.greenbuildingforum.co.uk/newforum/comments.php?DiscussionID=15130&page=13#Item_13

 

[Temp]

BBC report that a combination thought to be ok has failed test in Dubai...

 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44748514

Edited July 7, 2018 by Temp

[Triassic]

I read that the Police have started taking statements under caution. Will we ever get to the truth ?

[Carrerahill]

On 07/07/2018 at 07:38, Temp said:

BBC report that a combination thought to be ok has failed test in Dubai...

 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44748514

 

The engineering consultancy my wife works for is running and project managing an EU wide cladding test program - in fact, it is her project.

 

Many testing companies are backing out and stating rather trivial details as the reason, it would appear that they are all aware that really any cladding made with anything other than a cementitious base or metal is going to fail. All these cladding products use plastic or cover plastic and I mean that in the widest sense, foams, plastics everything. Cladding for aesthetic reasons is going to be OK but if the purpose is energy conservation then really it is not a fire safe product.

 

They are also looking at the environmental impact of the stuff and the CO2 and nasty chemicals involved may actually cause more environmental damage than burning a bit of extra gas or electricity to keep the building warm/cool especially as we enter a new era of clean power. I don't think we have used coal for over 3 weeks now. So do we stop filling our houses with horrible chemicals and plastics and just use a bit more energy and stick to good quality natural material based insulation?

 

 

Edited June 7, 2019 by Carrerahill

[Jeremy Harris]

52 minutes ago, Triassic said:

I read that the Police have started taking statements under caution. Will we ever get to the truth ?

 

 

I strongly suspect that the people who cut corners (over long periods of time - this goes right to the heart of our failed accreditation and building inspection system) will never end up in court.  There might be a few scapegoats chosen for a slap on the wrist, but I get the feeling that this will be another Hillsborough, where feet will be dragged and nothing will be done for decades, until those who cut corners are too old to face justice.

 

Then again, I might just be a rather jaded old cynic.

[Dreadnaught]

"Grenfell survivors and relatives open US legal battle"

 

"The lawsuit will target the cladding maker Arconic, insulation maker Celotex and fridge supplier Whirlpool."

 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48576580?ns_campaign=bbcnews&ns_mchannel=social&ocid=socialflow_twitter&ns_source=twitter

 

Blimey!

[Jeremy Harris]

I read this and wondered whether they would succeed in such a case if it were brought here in the UK.  I suspect they wouldn't, as all three manufacturers could claim that they "acted in good faith" by having their products accredited as either meeting the required regulations or by meeting the Class O requirements.  The key issue seems to be that none of these products actually met the regulatory requirements in practice, and that the manufacturers of the cladding and insulation may have exploited the flaws in the accreditation system when they were given their Class O accreditation. 

 

The question then is whether it's the manufacturers that are wholly to blame or the accreditation scheme.  My view is that it's the latter, in the main, as we've been diluting the stringency with which regulations are applied for decades, first as a consequence of Thatcher's obsession with deregulation, privatisation and self-certification, and more recently as a consequence of financial pressures that have led to corners being cut (another thread here recently made the point that inspectors couldn't be bothered, or didn't have the time, to come out to do mandatory inspections, for example).

 

If we want stringent regulation to help preserve life, then we have to make sure it's rigorously enforced, and that means proper, mandatory, inspection and test, not some meaningless desk accreditation process by analogy (which is what seems to have been the case here).

[Temp]

I think more will come out during the course of the enquiry and related court cases.

 

I don't know about the fridge in the Grenfell case but I'm surprised that the plastic backing of some fridges is so flammable. I recall from when I was designing consumer electronics (computers and set top boxes) that special plastics had to be used for some front panels. 

 

https://www.which.co.uk/reviews/fridge-freezers/article/fridge-freezer-safety

 

Regarding accreditation schemes - has anyone else spotted a similarity with the Boeing 737 Max saga where it was also thought retraining/testing wasn't required because the new was similar to the old?

 

 

 

 

[Temp]

What the government believes...

 

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/503/503.pdf

 

Electrical Product Safety in the UK

The EU and UK Systems of product safety
1.The UK’s system of product safety is heavily intertwined with that of the EU. Producers and importers are required under the General Product Safety Regulations 20058 to take immediate corrective action if they become aware a product is unsafe. This action might entail a product recall, modification, repair or other process.9

 

The issue of plastic backs was first raised at least two years ago yet..

 

https://www.which.co.uk/news/2019/02/hundreds-of-potentially-unsafe-fridges-and-freezers-still-on-sale/

 

Hundreds of potentially unsafe fridges and freezers still on sale

Make sure you avoid a fire-risk fridge freezer by using our free backing checker before you buy

By  Ben Slater

11 Feb 2019

 

 

[Jeremy Harris]

15 minutes ago, Temp said:

Regarding accreditation schemes - has anyone else spotted a similarity with the Boeing 737 Max saga where it was also thought retraining/testing wasn't required because the new was similar to the old?

 

 

Many years ago, when I did the Airworthiness for Military Aircraft course at Cranwell, we spent a long time going through the "read across" principles, and what could and could not be read across from an older approved component to a newer, seemingly identical component.  One key principle was that we should seek to apply the current airworthiness approval standard, even to a new model of an older aircraft, unless this was proved to be wholly impractical.  I think the most public example of this principle being adhered to by a colleague at the time was the refusal to grant airworthiness approval to the Chinook Mk3s that were originally purchased for the Special Forces.  The cockpit systems included software that didn't meet any of the UK safety approval requirements, so the new aircraft were grounded as soon as they got here.  I faced a similar issue when I was the programme manager for Future Lynx (now Lynx Wildcat) in that the Honeywell/Rolls Royce FADEC system had code written in C, and compiled with a non-certified compiler, so it simply wasn't going to get a UK airworthiness approval as it stood. 

 

Boeing seem to have just stretched the "grandfather" rights of the 737 way beyond what was reasonable, even for the much more lax certification requirements that prevail in the US.

 

[Temp]

According to The Times there was another major fire involving cladding of flats yesterday.  20 flats were destroyed and 10 damaged. This time it was timber cladding.

 

Peter Mason, chairman of Barking Reach Residents Association had been reassured by Bellway Homes the developer that built the block, that the external wood cladding had been treated so that it would not catch fire for 30 mins after a blaze started.

Video of the fire showed it had spread up the block in only 70 seconds.

 

Good job the block was only 6 stories tall..

 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-48574044

https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/massive-fire-london-block-flats-16403706

 

 

 

[Temp]

New quote from The Times today.

 

Ian Gorst, from Bellway, told the residents meeting that the wooden cladding was NOT fire retardant. He said: "Below 18 meters, there is no requirement for any cladding on [or?] building material to be non-combustible or fire-treated. The timber is decorative"

Contrast that with yesterdays quote..

"Peter Mason, chairman of Barking Reach Residents Association had been reassured by Bellway Homes, the developer that built the block, that the external wood cladding had been treated so that it would not catch fire for 30 mins after a blaze started."

[joe90]

Building regs regarding fire protection needs a root and branch reform IMO.

[PeterW]

2 hours ago, joe90 said:

Building regs regarding fire protection needs a root and branch reform IMO.

 

The day we changed the regs from having fire officers doing inspections to a “fire risk assessment” being ok for public buildings was the biggest mistake ever ...

[joe90]

Is it true that “theoretical” safe practice assessment does not work. Real life, set fire to it and see how it reacts would be better surely.

[Temp]

Looks like the government might actually force a recall of Whirlpool tumble dryers...

 

https://news.sky.com/story/whirlpool-faces-tumble-dryer-recall-notice-over-fire-fears-11739916

 

Quote

 

In an "unprecedented" step, the government plans to order a company to recall hundreds of thousands of tumble dryers over fears they pose a fire safety risk.

The announcement was made by business minister Kelly Tolhurst, four years after a reported design flaw was first identified in Whirlpool-produced machines that allowed fluff from clothing to reach heating elements.

 

Consumer groups claim the problem has been linked to hundreds of fires.

Whirlpool, whose brands include Indesit and Hotpoint, was ordered to fix the problem free of charge but the company has been repeatedly accused of dragging its feet.
 

 

Edited June 11, 2019 by Temp

[epsilonGreedy]

On 10/06/2019 at 14:12, JSHarris said:

I think the most public example of this principle being adhered to by a colleague at the time was the refusal to grant airworthiness approval to the Chinook Mk3s that were originally purchased for the Special Forces.  The cockpit systems included software that didn't meet any of the UK safety approval requirements, so the new aircraft were grounded as soon as they got here.

 

 

I recall a different version of events. Computer Weekly made this one of their main subjects of investigation for years probably because malfunctioning software killed military personnel.

 

The MOD could have purchased Chinooks equipped with the manufacturer's own cockpit control software but instead the MOD decided Britain's domestic industrial/military complex could do better. The Chinooks were delivered minus cockpit control parts and the British developed alternative fitted. The British software then attempted to murder crew and passengers by issuing random instructions to the engine, the most notable was a call for maximum engine power. Handling the uncommanded max engine power problem was added to the pilot's type education course.

 

Things got so bad in the end pilots refused to fly them and the national maintenance base for Chinooks had to dispatch their gun-ho test pilots around the country to collect the abandoned giants.

 

The SAS continued to fly them which led to the crash in Scotland that wiped out the core of the UK's counter intelligence team combating the IRA.

 

The RAF blamed the pilots until it became known the deceased pilot had called home days earlier to review arrangements with his father in law for the financial support of his family in the event of his death, such was his lack of faith in the reliability of the Chinook software.

[Jeremy Harris]

1 hour ago, epsilonGreedy said:

 

I recall a different version of events. Computer Weekly made this one of their main subjects of investigation for years probably because malfunctioning software killed military personnel.

 

The MOD could have purchased Chinooks equipped with the manufacturer's own cockpit control software but instead the MOD decided Britain's domestic industrial/military complex could do better. The Chinooks were delivered minus cockpit control parts and the British developed alternative fitted. The British software then attempted to murder crew and passengers by issuing random instructions to the engine, the most notable was a call for maximum engine power. Handling the uncommanded max engine power problem was added to the pilot's type education course.

 

Things got so bad in the end pilots refused to fly them and the national maintenance base for Chinooks had to dispatch their gun-ho test pilots around the country to collect the abandoned giants.

 

The SAS continued to fly them which led to the crash in Scotland that wiped out the core of the UK's counter intelligence team combating the IRA.

 

The RAF blamed the pilots until it became known the deceased pilot had called home days earlier to review arrangements with his father in law for the financial support of his family in the event of his death, such was his lack of faith in the reliability of the Chinook software.

 

 

No, definitely not the case.  When I was the Lynx IPTL the Chinook IPTL was on the floor below me.  The software was definitely supplied with the cabs as a condition of the deal.  The price was a lot lower than if the normal practice of buying the arframes and fitting UK spec avionics had been used, and there was a time saving.  SF were keen to get the cabs into service ASAP, to meet an urgent operational requirement, so the normal procurement process by DPA Abbeywood was pretty much bypassed.  The result was that when the cabs were delivered, Boscombe Down refused (quite rightly, IMHO) to give them a CA Release.  The cabs were grounded and locked away in a hangar for years, until someone found the money to retrofit them with Mk 2 cockpits and get them into service. 

 

The accident on the Mull of Kintyre was an entirely different aircraft type, the much older HC Mk 1 (converted to HC Mk 2), without the glass cockpit and associated software that caused the problems with the Mk 3 CA Release.  The instrument panel on ZD576 was "clockwork", with old-style analogue instruments.  Some of the families continued (still do, I think) to hold the view that there was an unknown FADEC problem with the HC Mk 1, but frankly, having seen pretty much everything that went into the FADEC investigation (it was directly related to our own FADEC concerns with the CTS800) I'm very far from convinced that the ZD576 accident was anything other than CFIT as a consequence of pilot error.  There was a long chain of mistakes and pressure applied to the crew that led to them flying in conditions that were well below minima for that type.

[daiking]

 

https://mobile.twitter.com/PeteApps/status/1139066783724384256

 

#nooneingovernmentcouldhaveforeseenthis

 

A normal format article by this writer

 

https://www.insidehousing.co.uk/insight/61834

 

Edited June 13, 2019 by daiking

[epsilonGreedy]

On 22/05/2018 at 10:41, Ferdinand said:

Reminds me why I now listen to R5. At least they do not pretend that they are trying to be serious.

 

 

I reached the same conclusion few years ago, when they decide to be serious on R5 the level of discourse and subject discovery is far superior to R4. It really is time to make the Beeb tax as optional as a Netflix subscription.

 

Edit: Whoops I jumped back a year.

Edited June 13, 2019 by epsilonGreedy

[epsilonGreedy]

23 hours ago, JSHarris said:

The accident on the Mull of Kintyre was an entirely different aircraft type, the much older HC Mk 1 (converted to HC Mk 2), without the glass cockpit and associated software that caused the problems with the Mk 3 CA Release.  The instrument panel on ZD576 was "clockwork", with old-style analogue instruments.  Some of the families continued (still do, I think) to hold the view that there was an unknown FADEC problem with the HC Mk 1, but frankly, having seen pretty much everything that went into the FADEC investigation (it was directly related to our own FADEC concerns with the CTS800) I'm very far from convinced that the ZD576 accident was anything other than CFIT as a consequence of pilot error.  There was a long chain of mistakes and pressure applied to the crew that led to them flying in conditions that were well below minima for that type.

 

Despite the procurement screw-ups I think you are right about the Mull of Kintyre crash.

 

In the same period the SAS suffered another full passenger load  tragedy in a Chinook off the Falklands, I imagine with their direct links to upper echelons of power the Regiment put the MOD boffins under pressure to sort it out.

 

Even more depressing is that 10 or 20 years later the grounded batch of Chinooks was still mothballed just when the lack of heavy lift helicopters was killing troops in Afghanistan.