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Everything posted by SteamyTea
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Most portable air conditioners suck – but there's an easy fix Efficiency ratings on portable air conditioners don’t give consumers the full picture, and one type of aircon unit is so inefficient that it should be banned, says Michael Le Page By Michael Le Page 19 June 2026 Single-hose air conditioners suck hot air in from outside Ton Hazewinkel/Getty Images Thinking of getting a portable air conditioner as sweltering heatwaves become more common? You will want to know that many, if not most, portable air conditioners have a serious design flaw – and that there is no label required to inform buyers of this. I had no idea about it when I bought a portable air conditioner. What’s most shocking is that there is an easy fix – and I think the law needs to be changed so that no portable air conditioners can be sold without it. First, let’s deal with the idea, especially common in the UK, that it is somehow wrong to buy an air conditioner. If you don’t need it where you are, great. But lots of us live in homes that get too hot during heatwaves, even when you do all the right things, like shutting blinds and windows during the day. And being too hot is bad for our health – sometimes, it is even deadly. It also makes it hard to work or do schoolwork. If it is OK to use energy to heat homes, I think it is also OK to use energy to stay cool – what’s the difference? The fact is that, as the world heats up, more and more of us will resort to air conditioning to stay cool. Reducing the energy used by all these extra air conditioners is really important to minimise extra carbon emissions that result in even more warming – and even more need for air conditioners. To understand the design flaw, you need to know how air conditioners work. The most efficient ones have a split system. There’s an outside unit, where a refrigerant is compressed to make it liquid, heating it up. It is then cooled by a heat exchanger over which outside air is blown. The refrigerant then goes through a narrow pipe to the inside unit, where it is turned into a gas, cooling it down. That goes through another heat exchanger over which the room air is blown, cooling that air by transferring its heat to the refrigerant. So the room air stays in the room, and only the heat is taken out. There is also less noise with split systems, because the compressor is outside. But they are almost all expensive, built-in systems – very few portable split systems are available, in part because, for upstairs rooms, there is usually nowhere to put the outside unit. Instead of an outside unit, some portable air conditioners bring air from outside into the room. There is a wide air intake hose that sucks in outside air, and the heated air is blown out of a similar hose. Dual-hose air conditioners, as they are known, are less efficient than split systems. The outlet hose transfers some heat to the room – you can reduce this by wrapping a blanket around it – and if the hose ends are too close, heated air can get sucked into the intake. But as with split systems, room air stays in the room. With single-hose portable air conditioners, however, there’s no air intake hose. Instead, room air is used to cool the hot refrigerant and then blown out of the single hose, which means hot outside air is continuously sucked into the room. If there’s a window open, hot air will come in through that. With the windows closed, the hot air will come via other parts of your home, warming them along the way. Either way, the air conditioner is constantly having to cool hot outside air, and so it has to use much more energy. It’s like adding mud to laundry detergent. What’s more, the efficiency of single-hose air conditioners falls rapidly as it gets hotter outside. They will fail to keep a room cool much sooner than a similarly powered dual-hose one. This is a huge design flaw, but in Europe, none of the labels tells you this. The specifications for an air conditioner state its cooling capacity in British thermal units, but this is simply a measure of heat transfer within a machine. It doesn’t take into account the fact that more heat has to be transferred if hot air is continuously sucked into a room. The same is true of the seasonal energy efficiency ratio, or SEER, numbers you might find. These are just the cooling capacity divided by the electricity consumed. By these measures, dual-hose air conditioners appear no better than single-hose ones that are easier to set up. “Consumers find dealing with the two ducts difficult and often don’t have the space to vent two ducts out of the room,” says Chris Michael at the cooling company Meaco. So it isn’t surprising that people choose single-hose units and that dual-hose ones are very hard to find in the UK. The US is doing better on the labelling front. It has introduced two measures that take into account hot air sucked into a room and heat coming off the air outlet hose. There’s the seasonally adjusted cooling capacity, or SACC, which is much lower than the unadjusted capacity number, typically by a third or more. Even more important is the combined energy efficiency ratio, or CEER. It’s here that you start to see how much more efficient dual-hose air conditioners are. But in my view, these numbers still don’t give buyers the full picture. Both the SACC and CEER measurements assume the outdoor temperature is 28°C (82.4°F) for 80 per cent of the time an air conditioner is running, and 35°C (95°F) for 20 per cent. I don’t need air conditioning at 28°C – it’s how an air conditioner performs when the thermometer hits 40°C (104°F) that’s most important to me. Now here’s the most ridiculous thing. Most single-hose air conditioners are essentially dual-hose units that come with only one hose. All you need to fix this flaw is another hose and an attachment. At least one manufacturer, GE, sells a conversion kit for some of its single-hose models – and advertises it as increasing cooling power by three times. Three times! Lots of people make DIY conversions, ranging from tape-and-cardboard affairs to 3D-printed parts, and every account I have read says it makes a big difference. That was my experience when I tried a crude conversion during the May heatwave in the UK, with the whole house feeling much cooler. So, in my view, at the very least, the labelling of portable air conditioners needs to be changed in the UK and the European Union to reflect their real-world performance during the hottest heatwaves. It is bizarre and misleading that single-hose air conditioners can have “A” ratings for efficiency. Better still would be a complete ban on the sale of single-hose air conditioners. All portable units should be sold as dual-hose, with the option to use them as single-hose when people really cannot have a dual-hose setup. Put another way, no single-hose air conditioner should be sold without a conversion kit. Michael says Meaco is considering introducing such a machine in 2027. I tried to find out who in the UK is responsible for regulating portable air conditioners, and hit a blank. The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero did not respond to a request for comment. Nor did the Energy Saving Trust get back to me. But hopefully the right person might end up reading this. There’s an easy climate win to be achieved here.
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‘Forgotten’ pollutants cause 15 per cent of global warming So-called indirect greenhouse gases, including carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds, aren’t covered by climate policies even though they heat the planet By Alec Luhn 11 June 2026 The burning of grasslands and forests for agriculture can release carbon monoxide and black carbon, which contribute to global warming Jonas Gratzer/Jonas Gratzer Carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds don’t just poison the air we breathe. They also fuel chemical reactions in the atmosphere that heat the planet. Of all the global warming that has happened since the pre-industrial era, about 15 per cent has been caused by emissions other than greenhouse gases, mainly carbon monoxide and VOCs. That is double the contribution of nitrous oxide, the third-most-common greenhouse gas after carbon dioxide and methane. But few countries include these common “indirect greenhouse gases” in their emissions reduction targets. “There is a set of forgotten climate pollutants that are strongly contributing to today’s warming and could considerably slow down the rate of warming in the future if we start including them in our climate policies,” says Ilissa Ocko at Spark Climate Solutions, a non-profit organisation based in California, who co-authored a study calling for more attention on these gases. Carbon monoxide and VOCs, which are released in part by fossil fuel use, react with other compounds in the atmosphere to form ozone. While naturally occurring ozone in the upper stratosphere filters harmful ultraviolet rays, ozone formed in the lower atmosphere traps heat that would otherwise radiate to space. Indirect greenhouse gases also warm the planet by reacting with hydroxyl radicals, a highly reactive “detergent” that scrubs the atmosphere clean of a wide variety of pollutants, including methane. If more hydroxyl reacts with carbon monoxide and VOCs, then less is available to break down methane, which, in the near-term, traps 80 times more heat than CO2. Together with black carbon or soot – another pollutant that isn’t included in climate plans and national emissions data – indirect greenhouse gases have caused 0.3°C of warming. A fraction of that has been compensated for by sun-blocking aerosols like sulphur dioxide, and also by nitrogen oxides. The latter make up a group of indirect greenhouse gases that, in some places, may warm Earth by creating low-level ozone, but is thought to have a net cooling effect overall because it generates hydroxyl radicals. While CO2 lasts for centuries in the atmosphere and methane survives for decades, indirect greenhouse gases break down within hours or, at most, a few years. That means the warming effect of these gases would quickly vanish if their emissions were reduced. “If we are heading for things like a [climate] tipping point or something like that, then this is the low-hanging fruit to prevent catastrophic change,” says Alex Archibald at the University of Cambridge. Carbon monoxide is emitted by the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, largely in appliances like gas boilers and stoves, as well as in older vehicles. Another source is the burning of grasslands and forests for agriculture in places like the Amazon. VOCs include a variety of hydrocarbons that evaporate from fossil fuels or from paint and cleaning solvents. Air pollution regulations in countries like the UK have reduced indirect greenhouse gases by adopting emissions standards for vehicles, appliances and industry, and limiting the VOC content in paints and varnishes. But many countries have looser rules, and they are focused on reducing exposure at ground level rather than throughout the atmosphere. In January, the US Environmental Protection Agency issued a regulation that scientists say will weaken controls on emissions of nitrogen oxides by gas power plants. Countries should start mentioning indirect greenhouse gases in the action plans they submit to the United Nations climate body under the Paris Agreement, and eventually set targets to reduce them, says Ocko. Otherwise, decarbonisation efforts could perpetuate or even increase some indirect greenhouse gas emissions, according to Alastair Lewis at the University of York, UK. As the smallest molecule, hydrogen often leaks and is sometimes vented by manufacturers into the atmosphere, where it consumes hydroxyl radicals and forms ozone and water vapour. If countries achieve their most expansive plans to replace fossil fuels with hydrogen in industrial processes like steel-making and fertiliser manufacture, the venting and leakage of this gas could heat the globe by an additional 0.1°C by 2100, for instance. Burning hydrogen or synthetic aviation fuels in aircraft also produces nitrogen oxides and water vapour. “If you burn a low-carbon fuel rather than use a battery, it may well be – from your carbon-accounting perspective – there’s no difference, but from an air pollution and indirect [greenhouse gas] point of view, it may be that there’s a big difference,” says Lewis. Journal reference: Science DOI: 10.1126/science.aee5790
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'Where We Live' - a survey of the decline in British housing.
SteamyTea replied to MAB's topic in Housing Politics
I have been saying for decades that for every rule we have that says we must6 do something, we have another rule that says we cannot do it. -
'Where We Live' - a survey of the decline in British housing.
SteamyTea replied to MAB's topic in Housing Politics
I think it is about 13% urbanisation, of which 3% is housing. Most of the UK is green. Even zooming it on the busy bit shows a lot of green. And zooming in on my bit shows that there is more rock than houses. Cornwall could have 1 million houses built on it and it would not change the physical character of the place. -
'Where We Live' - a survey of the decline in British housing.
SteamyTea replied to MAB's topic in Housing Politics
Didn't Manchester have huge developments of 1 and 2 bed city homes that stayed empty for ages. It is impossible to design a town really. Towns grew to take advantage of local resources i.e. rivers, agriculture, mines. Apart from agriculture, which is low labour these days, most of our industry and commerce is 'mobile'. We don't have the same need for towns and cities anymore. -
'Where We Live' - a survey of the decline in British housing.
SteamyTea replied to MAB's topic in Housing Politics
I lived in Milton Keynes for a few months. It was a great place. I lived in Basildon when I was a kid, never thought that it was a bad place. I also lived on the outskirts of Canterbury, nice place. Witney was alright to, though I was a couple of miles out. Penn was dreadful, but I was a late teen then, so everything was terrible. Bournemouth was great, but I was a student. Aylesbury was very run down when I moved there, but had everything I needed at the time. Abbots Langley was good, for a small place. Now I live in a dreadfully run down place, but have been here longer than anywhere else. While my house is pretty shit, the A30 is only 2 minutes away and that means I can get to places quickly. The sea is only 4 minutes drive away, or half hour walk. I struggle to know what I want when it comes to knowing where to live. I like the idea of some isolation, but I want convenience and culture of larger towns. The one thing that is pushing me more to rural is, oddly enough, cars. As we electrify transport, I will need a decent drive/garage. These only come at a premium price in towns. -
Nearly half the yearly production though, so effectively doubling the installed price. Left is South facing and right is North facing.
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Make your mind up what units to use. 400,000 [£] / 372 [m2] = £1,075/m2 which is pretty cheap.
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So put up expensive panels that have lower efficiency, facing away from the sun for 9 months of the year. Just offer to pay a quid per kWh for your electricity. There are much easier cash savings to be made.
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Why do you want PV? I very much suspect that stick on flexible panels will be cost effective.
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Just make sure the jug is out of shot
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Apparently there is a difference depending on relative surface areas, so an aluminium rivet in SS is bad, but a SS screw into aluminium is not so bad. Chlorine generation from electrolysis is the biggest problem. Would be interesting to look at the mountings on the Marina Drive property that is less than 50m from the sea and is frequently battered by sea spray. The PV has been there about 15 years.
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Have to be the correct grade of stainless steel fixings. A4, 316 grade is recommended. Then comes the Screws or Bolts debate. It's bolts that need to be used.
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I can't, they are the optimum size to fill my roof up. Sounds like a salesman, would not make any difference. That would be my worry. Seems odd, but could make the most sense.
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Well I just rebooted the ESP and it has all stopped working. Job for a rainy day.
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Well it logged all night and seemed to do what I wanted it to do.
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Slight confession, I have been playing with an ESP32 tonight. Got it to log some text over my network. Something I have been meaning to do your years. I did ask ChatGPT to write the Python scripts. The RPi one was good, almost, the uPython was bollocks, but got it sorted the old fashioned way: traditional web search and 20 fags.
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Which is what I was taught to do in the early 1980s. Does it recognise flow diagrams, assuming they are done correctly? Once saw a comment in a database that said "this is shit code"
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I hate coding, even though I do appreciate what can be achieved with it. But as computer coding is a logical processes, is AI not showing up it's weakness but not being able to write some scripts easily? Or is it that most programming languages are so full of contradictions that the whole industry needs to have a word with itself.
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Some food for though there. https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/gas-share-in-global-power-mix-has-declined-for-a-fifth-consecutive-year/ This analysis examines how the role of gas in the global power sector is changing as renewable electricity expands across major economies. It explores long-term trends in gas-fired generation globally and across key markets, including the G7, China, India and Brazil. Summary Gas’s role in the global power mix is declining The share of gas in the global power mix declined for the fifth consecutive year in 2025, despite a small rise in absolute gas generation. Strong growth in clean power, led by solar and wind, met around 68% of global electricity demand growth over the last five years (2021-2025), reducing the need for a significant rise in gas power generation. 2025 was the fifth consecutive year of decline in gas share in the global power mix. Although global gas generation has not yet peaked in absolute terms, its growth has slowed sharply. Between 2021 and 2025, gas generation grew at an average annual rate of 1.6%, about half the average growth rate seen between 2016 and 2020 (2.9%). Because gas grew more slowly than electricity demand, its share of global electricity generation fell from 23.9% in 2020 to 21.8% in 2025. Nearly half of gas-generating economies have passed their gas power peak. By 2025, 61 out of 124 economies generating electricity from gas had passed their gas generation peak, defined in this analysis as countries where gas-fired electricity generation has remained below its historical peak for at least five consecutive years. Together, these countries accounted for around one-fifth of global gas-fired electricity generation in 2025, showing that gas declines are widespread, but the global peak still depends on a smaller group of large gas-generating economies. Renewables are close to overtaking gas power in the G7. The G7 accounted for 37% of global gas-fired electricity generation in 2025. Four G7 gas import-dependent economies — the UK, Germany, Italy and Japan — have remained below their historical gas generation peaks for at least five consecutive years. Across the G7 as a whole, gas has not yet peaked, but there are growing signs of a plateau. Its share fell for a second consecutive year, while generation also declined in 2025. At the same time, renewable power has grown consistently and, in 2025, generated almost as much electricity (2,544 TWh) as gas power (2,577 TWh), helping clean power overtake fossil power in the G7 electricity mix. Brazil, China and India are meeting rising electricity demand without turning to gas. The world’s three largest emerging economies, which accounted for 42% of global electricity demand in 2025, continue to grow while maintaining relatively low levels of gas generation in their power systems. China’s gas share remained close to 3% of the electricity mix in 2025 despite rapid demand growth. In India and Brazil, gas has already peaked and now plays a more limited balancing role. The economics and energy security case for electricity are increasingly moving in the same direction. As renewables lower costs and reduce exposure to fuel price shocks and geopolitical disruptions, gas is steadily losing the advantages that once made it the default fuel for power system growth. Malgorzata Wiatros-Motyka Senior Electricity Analyst, Ember Recent geopolitical disruptions have also reinforced the downward trend in gas by exposing the price volatility and energy security risks associated with import-dependent gas systems. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered major gas supply disruptions and price spikes, accelerating renewables deployment in Europe and Asia. More recently, LNG disruptions linked to the US-Israel war with Iran in 2026 are expected to further accelerate this shift. Together, these trends suggest that gas is increasingly shifting from a source of structural growth in the power sector towards a balancing role alongside expanding renewable electricity systems. The world is nearing the gas power peak 2025 marked the fifth consecutive year of decline in gas share in the global electricity mix, as clean power grew faster than electricity demand, limiting the need for a significant rise in gas generation and suggesting that the world may be nearing a peak in gas-fired power. Global electricity demand more than doubled over the last two decades, increasing from 15,279 TWh in 2000 to 31,774 TWh in 2025, driven by industrialisation, rising living standards and electrification. Historically, much of this demand growth was met by fossil fuels, including gas. However, the role of gas in meeting new electricity demand is now changing as renewable power scales up rapidly across most countries. Global gas power growth is slowing as clean electricity meets more demand Since 2000, gas-fired electricity generation has continued to increase globally, but its role in meeting new electricity demand has weakened. Between 2001 and 2005, gas accounted for an average 33% of growth in global electricity demand at a time when renewable deployment remained limited. In the decade following the Paris Agreement, several advanced economies expanded gas generation as part of efforts to reduce coal use or diversify power systems. Between 2016 and 2020, gas still accounted for an average 31% of growth in new electricity demand. However, as renewables deployment accelerated globally, gas accounted for only about 11% of demand growth between 2021 and 2025. In 2025, gas accounted for less than 5% of global electricity demand growth, increasing by only 38 TWh (+0.6%). Solar alone grew by 636 TWh (+30%), 17 times more than gas, and met around 75% of global electricity demand growth. Because gas generation grew more slowly than demand, its share in the global power mix fell for the fifth consecutive year, from 23.9% in 2020 to 21.8% in 2025. Although global gas generation has not yet peaked in absolute terms, these trends suggest that gas power is losing momentum as a source of global growth and may be approaching a structural peak. Geopolitical disruptions have reinforced the downward trend in gas by exposing the price volatility and energy security risks associated with import-dependent gas systems. Major economies, including Germany, India, Japan and South Korea, have been committing to faster deployment of renewable sources as a response. Gas share in the power mix is stagnating or falling in most regions Gas share in power mixes is stagnating or declining as new demand is increasingly met by sources other than gas, particularly renewables. This suggests that gas is no longer the primary route for meeting rising electricity demand across much of the world. In traditionally coal-heavy regions such as Asia and Oceania, falling coal generation has not translated into a larger role for gas. Gas remained a relatively limited share of the regional power mix in 2025, accounting for 10.2% in Asia (down from 13.9% in 2015) and 15.1% in Oceania (down from 18.5% in 2015). In Europe, gas power share peaked in 2010 at 28.4% of the electricity mix, equivalent to 1,443 TWh. Since then, generation has fallen in absolute terms to 1,212 TWh, accounting for 23.8% of the mix. Falls in gas power occurred alongside coal power’s decline as clean power scaled up. In Latin America and the Caribbean, gas power share peaked in 2015 at 28.6% of the mix, equivalent to 460 TWh. As electricity demand continued to expand, gas power peaked in absolute terms in 2019, reaching 474 TWh or 28.2% of the mix. Since then, it has fallen to 448 TWh and 24.3% of the mix in 2025, as much of the region’s growing demand has been met by clean sources. In contrast, gas power is rising in North America, parts of the Middle East and Africa. This is especially evident in the US and Canada, where gas remains central to the power sector due to abundant domestic resources. In parts of the Middle East, gas has been used to replace some oil-fired generation, while in North Africa and parts of West Africa, domestic gas continues to support rising electricity demand. Nearly half of gas power-generating economies have passed their gas generation peak By 2025, 61 of 124 economies generating electricity from gas are now below their gas-generation peaks. Together, these countries accounted for around one-fifth of global gas-fired electricity generation in 2025. This shows that gas peaks are already widespread, but most generation remains concentrated in large economies that are still growing or have not yet clearly peaked. The largest declines since peak gas generation occurred in Japan (-127 TWh), followed by the UK (-85 TWh), India (-69 TWh), Spain (-59 TWh) and Italy (-48 TWh) — all economies exposed to imported gas or international gas prices. Japan recorded the largest absolute fall from the peak. Gas-fired generation peaked in 2017 at 464 TWh (43% of the electricity mix) before falling to 338 TWh (33%) in 2025. The decline reflected the restart of some nuclear reactors following the Fukushima disaster in 2011, alongside rapid solar expansion and falling electricity demand. In the UK, Spain and Italy, falling gas generation also coincided with declining coal generation and rising renewable electricity output. In the UK, the gas share fell from 176 TWh (45% of the electricity mix) in 2008 to 91 TWh (31%) in 2025, while coal was phased out completely in 2024 as offshore wind and other renewables expanded. Post-2015 gas growth has been concentrated in a few large markets In the decade after the Paris Agreement, gas continued to rise, but growth was concentrated. In some countries, particularly the US, gas expanded as coal declined or electricity systems diversified. In others, gas growth fell for country-specific reasons, including nuclear generation recovery and the strong growth in renewables. The US recorded the largest increase in gas generation between 2015 and 2025, with gas-fired electricity rising by 474 TWh — equivalent to just under one-third of global gas growth over the period. In the same period, the gas share in the US electricity mix increased from 33% to 40%, while coal share halved from 33% to 16%. China recorded the second largest increase, but gas remained a relatively small share of its electricity mix. Gas generation in China rose by 167 TWh over the decade, with its share rising from 2.9% to 3.2% between 2015 and 2025. Between 2015 and 2025, gas-fired generation in Japan fell by 80 TWh as nuclear reactors gradually restarted and solar deployment accelerated. Outside advanced economies, Viet Nam recorded one of the sharpest declines in gas reliance, where gas generation fell from 30% of the country’s electricity mix in 2015 to 6% in 2025, while both coal and renewable generation expanded rapidly to meet rising electricity demand. Other declines were spread across a diverse group of economies, including Venezuela, Brazil, Türkiye, India, the UK, Belarus, Belgium and Colombia. Gas generation is slowing in major power markets Renewables close to surpassing gas generation in G7 The G7 accounted for 37% of global gas-fired electricity generation in 2025, despite representing only around 10% of the world’s population. The US alone accounted for 26% of global gas power in 2025. Gas remains a significant share of the mix and has not yet reached a peak in generation, but there are growing signs of a plateau. Gas generation across the G7 expanded largely as a replacement for coal generation, particularly in the decade following the Paris Agreement. In 2025, gas generation in the G7 fell by 50 TWh, from 2,627 TWh to 2,577 TWh, leading to a small fall in the gas share of the power mix from 34.3% in 2024 to 32.9% in 2025. That is a decline for the second year in a row, as the share in 2023 was at 34.5%. At the same time, renewable power has grown consistently and generated almost as much electricity (2,544 TWh) as gas power (2,577 TWh) in 2025, helping clean power overtake fossil power in the G7 electricity mix. Additionally, four G7 gas import-dependent economies — the UK, Germany, Italy and Japan — have remained below their historical gas generation peaks for at least five consecutive years. Large emerging economies are growing with limited reliance on gas Brazil, China and India are increasing electricity demand while maintaining relatively low levels of gas generation in their power systems. China’s gas share remained close to 3% (334 TWh) of the electricity mix in 2025, despite rapid demand growth. In India, gas power peaked in 2010 at 12.6% of the electricity mix, or 118 TWh, and has since declined to 2.3% (49 TWh) in 2025. In Brazil, the gas share peaked in 2014 at 13.7% of the mix (81 TWh), and currently stands at 7.3% (55 TWh). All three economies rely to varying degrees on gas imports, while most new electricity demand is increasingly met by clean power. This suggests that even fast-growing electricity systems are not locked into gas reliance. As renewable deployment accelerates alongside grid expansion, storage and other flexibility solutions, the future role of gas in the power sector is likely to become more limited, regionally uneven and increasingly shaped by energy security and economic considerations. Supporting materials About Ember Ember is an independent energy think tank that aims to accelerate the clean energy transition with data and policy. Its vision is a clean, electrified energy system for all. It gathers, curates and analyses data on the global energy system, publishing this openly and accessibly. It uses data-driven insights to shift the conversation towards high impact policies and empower other advocates to do the same. Founded in 2008 as Sandbag, it formerly focused on analysing and reforming the EU carbon market, before rebranding as Ember in 2020. Its diverse team brings together energy analysts, data scientists, communicators and team-builders based around the world in over 20 countries, including Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa, Türkiye, the UK and US. Methodology General methodology Electricity generation data for countries, regions and the world is based on Ember’s yearly data. Data is gathered for 215 countries, with latest 2025 data for 91 countries, including national transmission system operators, statistical agencies and data aggregators such as ENTSO-E. In some cases, published data was not available for the full reported timeframe; here, we have estimated recent years using Ember’s own generation forecasting model. Regional and world data is largely based on actual reported data, with Ember’s yearly data covering countries representing more than 90% of global electricity demand. Other countries are estimated. A full methodology on data sources and methods is available here. Note on electricity source classification Bioenergy has typically been assumed (by the IPCC, the IEA and many others) to be a renewable energy source, as forest and energy crops can be regrown and replenished, unlike fossil fuels. It is included in many governmental climate targets, including EU renewable energy legislation. Ember, therefore, includes it in “renewables” to allow easy comparison with legislated targets. However, we recognise that the IPCC-reported lifecycle carbon intensity of bioenergy is significantly higher than other renewables and nuclear, and this is incorporated into our power sector emissions estimate. More information about Ember’s classification of electricity sources can be found in the full methodology for Ember’s monthly electricity data under “Fuel Types”. Gas usage peak definition and caveats If absolute gas generation remains below its peak output for at least five years since a country’s initial gas power peak, it is considered to have passed its peak. Falls in gas generation for some economies may have been caused by external factors such as war, civil unrest or recession. For these countries, such as Ukraine or Yemen, data reporting can be limited, is largely based on estimates and has significantly lower accuracy. Some economies reported to be past a peak in gas power may have replaced domestic gas generation with electricity imports. Acknowledgements Ember: Richard Black, Raul Miranda, Rashmi Mishra, Dave Jones, Sarah Brown, Wilmar Suárez, Nicolas Fulghum, Libby Copsey, Lauren Orso, Muyi Yang, Neshwin Rodrigues, Ardhi Arsala Rahmani, Claire Kaelin We thank our external reviewers: Toby Lockwood (CATF), Scott Smouse (Enerconnex Global, LLC, formerly with the US DoE), Sanjay Pande (Independent Researcher and Consultant, formerly with NTPC Limited, India) Cover image Canetti / Getty images
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"You will rejoice to hear that no disaster has accompanied the commencement of an enterprise which you have regarded with such evil forebodings" Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_economy_in_aircraft An Airbus 380 on a long haul flight uses 3.27 l/100 km (86.39 British MPG) I went to Australia and back in a 747-400, that does 3.76 l/100km, which is 75 MPG. That is about the same as my car does on an upcountry run, though it does around 10 MPG less locally. The route I took to Sydney was via San Francisco, and the route back was via Kuala Lumpur, a total of 23,458 miles or 37,752 km. That works out at 1,420 litre of fuel. That flight was for work, and was, nearly 25 years ago (where has my life vanished, I booked the flight just after 911 and got it for $400. I also got bumped off the flight, got my $400 back and an upgrade to 1st Class to KL and then Business Class to Heathrow). Since then, I have probably driven 625,000 miles in various cars, the worse on economy was my little Corsa Automatic, it struggled to do 40 MPG (and was a lot worse around London), but all the other have easily done 50 MPG. So about 2270 lt/year, which is 5.6 l/100km. Should have stayed in Australia.
